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TAX LAW
I. REFUND OF STATE INcoME TAXES TO FEDERAL RETIREES DENIED
AND STATE'S TAX REFUND STATUTE NARROWLY CONSTRUED
In Bass v. State1 the South Carolina Supreme Court prospectively
applied the United States Supreme Court decision in Davis v. Michi-
gan Department of the Treasury2 and denied approximately 62,000
federal retirees a refund of state income taxes paid for the years 1985
through 1988.3 The cost of this refund would have exceeded
$200,000,000.4
Since 1945 South Carolina has exempted up to three thousand
dollars of a federal retiree's pension from state income tax, while to-
tally exempting retirement pensions of the State of South Carolina.5
After the Davis decision the state legislature eliminated this unconsti-
tutional preferential treatment by limiting the exemption of state pen-
sions to three thousand dollars." Several federal retirees brought a class
action pursuant to section 12-47-440 of the South Carolina Code" to
recover the state income taxes paid for the previous three years. The
trial court certified the class action, granted summary judgment in
favor of the federal retirees, and ordered the issuance of refunds with
interest. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed.8
Because the United States Supreme Court did not decide the issue
of retroactivity in Davis, the dispositive issue that faced the Bass court
was whether to apply Davis retroactively or prospectively in South
Carolina.9 The court relied on the test articulated in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson ° in deciding this issue. The court concluded that Davis should
be applied prospectively from the date it was decided.11 The court
1. 395 S.E.2d 171 (S.C. 1990) (per curiam), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2881 (1991).
2. 489 U.S. 803 (1989). In Davis the Court held that the state taxation of federal
retirees' income at a different rate than state retirees violated the constitutional doctrine
of intergovernmental tax immunity. Id. at 817.
3. See Record at 51.
4. Bass, 395 S.E.2d at 174.
5. Id. at 172.
6. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 9-1-1680, 12-7-435 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
7. Id. § 12-47-440 (Law. Co-op. 1976). The statute of limitations on tax refund
actions under section 12-47-440 is three years. Id.
8. Bass, 395 S.E.2d at 172.
9. Id.
10. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
11. Bass, 395 S.E.2d at 175. See Ragsdale v. Department of Revenue, 11 Or. Tax 440
1
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found that retroactive application of Davis would produce inequitable
results because the federal retirees had already received the benefits of
state public services paid for by their illegally collected taxes. 12 Addi-
tionally, the court noted that the burden of the refund on the state
budget would be so severe as to endanger the state's financial
integrity.1
3
The Bass court cited James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State4 in
support of its decision.' 5 In Beam the Georgia Supreme Court consid-
ered whether to apply the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias' retroactively or prospectively. In
Bacchus the Court held that Hawaii's exemption of certain locally pro-
duced liquors from an excise tax imposed on sales of liquor at whole-
sale violated the Commerce Clause.17 Shortly thereafter the Georgia
legislature amended a state statute that imposed a higher tax on alco-
holic beverages imported into the state than on those manufactured in
the state.'8 James B. Beam Distilling Company (Beam) sued to recover
the extra taxes it paid pursuant to the old statute. The Georgia Su-
preme Court decided that the old statute violated the Commerce
Clause, but refused to grant Beam a refund.'9 The court employed the
Chevron test and concluded that Bacchus should be applied prospec-
tively.,20 Following the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Bass, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Georgia court and
held that Bacchus should be applied retroactively.21 The Court then
vacated Bass and remanded Bass to the South Carolina Supreme
Court for reconsideration in light of Beam.
22
In addition to reconsidering its retroactivity analysis, the South
Carolina Supreme Court must now readdress its construction of the
state tax refund statutes. Shortly after rendering its decision in 1990,
the Bass court amended its original opinion and added that even if it
applied Davis retroactively, the federal retirees were barred from re-
ceiving a refund because they did not pay under protest.2 3 The court
(1990) (refusing to apply Davis retroactively after declaring a tax statute very similar to
that involved in Bass unconstitutional).
12. Bass, 395 S.E.2d at 174.
13. Id.
14. 259 Ga. 363, 382 S.E.2d 95 (1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
15. Bass, 395 S.E.2d at 173.
16. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
17. Id. at 273.
18. Beam, 259 Ga. at 363, 382 S.E.2d at 95.
19. Id. at 364, 382 S.E.2d at 96.
20. Id. at 364-67, 382 S.E.2d at 96-97.
21. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 2439 (1991).
22. Bass v. South Carolina, 111 S. Ct. 2881 (1991).
23. Bass v. State, 395 S.E.2d 171, 175 (S.C. 1990) (per curiam), vacated, 111 S. Ct.
1991]
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declared that sections 12-47-2102 and 12-47-22025 of the South Caro-
lina Code, and not section 12-47-440,21 controlled this action.17 The
court noted, "We have previously stated that the exclusive remedy for
the recovery of the erroneous assessment of income taxes is through
these 'pay under protest' statutes."2 8
The Bass court relied upon the recent United States Supreme
Court decision in McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco" for the proposition that a state may "establish procedural
requirements which must be complied with before a refund action is
permitted. '30 In McKesson the Court reversed the Florida Supreme
Court's decision that a state need not refund or provide relief for taxes
collected pursuant to an unconstitutional statute." The Court held
that "the Due Process Clause requires the State to afford taxpayers a
meaningful opportunity to secure postpayment relief for taxes already
paid pursuant to a tax scheme ultimately found unconstitutional.
'32
The Bass court correctly recognized that McKesson permits states
to establish procedural requirements for the refund of taxes.33 How-
ever, the court's narrow interpretation of section 12-47-440 will have a
devastating impact on the opportunity for postpayment relief by tax-
payers. Section 12-47-440 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Title, whenever it shall
appear to any taxpayer that any license fee or tax imposed under this
Title has been erroneously, improperly or illegally assessed, collected
or otherwise paid over to the [South Carolina Tax] Commission, the
taxpayer ... may make application to the Commission to abate or
refund in whole or in part such license fee or tax.. . . The provisions
of this section shall apply whether or not the license fee or tax in
question was paid under protest . . .
The Bass court interpreted section 12-47-440 to apply only to li-
cense fees and license taxes, not to refunds of unlawfully collected in-
2881 (1991).
24. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-210 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
25. Id. § 12-47-220.
26. Id. § 12-47-440.
27. Bass, 395 S.E.2d at 175 & n.5.
28. Id. at 175 (citing Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n,
255 S.C. 523, 180 S.E.2d 195 (1971)).
29. 110 S. Ct. 2238 (1990).
30. Bass, 395 S.E.2d at 175.
31. McKesson, 110 S. Ct. at 2242.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 2254-55, 2257.
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-47-440 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
[Vol. 43
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come taxes.3 5 The court's narrow interpretation may not completely
bar taxpayers from securing refunds, but in the case of the federal re-
tirees, the burden of payment under protest effectively denies the
"meaningful opportunity" for the refund envisioned by the McKesson
Court. Furthermore, the court's interpretation of section 12-47-440 is
contrary to the legislature's intent to provide a method for taxpayers
to obtain refunds of unlawfully collected taxes without entering a
"minefield of technicality.""8
Section 12-47-440's reference to "any license fee or tax" was not
intended to limit the section to license fees and license taxes; rather,
the "license" language merely distinguishes section 12-47-440 from
other sections within Title 12 that require payment under protest. The
South Carolina Supreme Court has addressed this section before. In
City of Columbia v. Glens Falls Insurance Co.3 7 the court stated that
"by the enactment in 1960 of [section 12-47-440] the Tax Commission
is granted authority to order refunded certain taxes, including State
license fees, which have been 'erroneously, improperly or illegally as-
sessed, collected, or otherwise paid over to the (Tax) Commission.' "
38
The Bass court's interpretation of section 12-47-440 is a considerable
retreat from the Glens Falls position.
The South Carolina legislature's enactment of section 12-47-44511
less than three months after the Davis decision provides evidence that
section 12-47-440 was understood to govern the federal retirees' pro-
posed refund. Section 12-47-445 provides, "The provisions of Section'
12-47-440 do not apply to claims for abatement or refund resulting
from a decision of a court of competent jurisdiction declaring a tax law
of this State unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful. '40 Because the
General Assembly did not create this new section until after the Davis
decision, the federal retirees are entitled to relief through the state's
previous refund law, section 12-47-440. The Bass court did not reach
35. Bass v. State, 395 S.E.2d 171, 175 n.5 (S.C. 1990) (per curiam), vacated, 111 S.
Ct. 2881 (1991). This narrow interpretation of section 12-47-440 is contrary to the expec-
tations of the State Tax Commission and practitioners in the state. See F. BOYLE & J.
VON LEHE, SOUTH CAROLINA INCOME TAxATION 1-5 (3d ed. 1987) ("Section 12-47-440 was
added 'on top of' the provision of Section 12-47-220 and is believed to have been enacted
to provide a remedy when payment was inadvertently [sic] made without written pro-
test."); see also South Carolina Tax Comm'n, SC Information Letter No. 90-37 (Oct. 12,
1990) (advising caution because of the unknown impact of Bass on refunds of taxes not
paid under protest).
36. Quirk, Taxpayer Remedies in South Carolina, 37 S.C.L. REV. 489, 512 (1986).
37. 245 S.C. 119, 139 S.E.2d 529 (1964).
38. Id. at 126, 139 S.E.2d at 531-32 (1964) (quoting the predecessor of section 12-47-
440, S.C. CODE ANN. § 65-2684 (1962)).
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the issue of retroactive application of section 12-47-445.
In Beam the United States Supreme Court was far from united in
its retroactivity analysis, but it clearly signaled the Bass court to apply
Davis retroactively. The South Carolina Supreme Court must then re-
vise its interpretation of section 12-47-440 to provide the meaningful
relief for taxpayers that the General Assembly intended. Finally, the
court must fashion a remedy for the federal retirees, through future tax
setoffs or otherwise, that truly compensates them for the taxes that
were unconstitutionally assessed against them.
R. Patrick Flynn
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AD VALOREM TAX REDUCTIONS FOR LARGE
INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES UPHELD
In Quirk v. Campbell"1 the South Carolina Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of section 4-29-67, 42 a 1988 amendment to the In-
dustrial Revenue Bond Act (the Act).43 Section 4-29-67 allows indus-
tries that make capital investments of at least eighty-five million dol-
lars to negotiate a reduced fee in lieu of the ad valorem taxes otherwise
required by article X, section 1(1) of the South Carolina Constitution.
44
The original Act permitted counties to buy and then lease back
industrial properties to private industrial enterprises as a means of
passing to these enterprises the benefits of the lower interest costs of
county bonds, which were exempt from federal income taxation. Sec-
tion 4-29-60 of the original Act required the industrial lessee to pay a
fee in lieu of ad valorem taxes that was equal to the amount of ad
valorem taxes that the industrial lessee would have paid if it owned the
property.45 Section 4-29-67, the new provision challenged in Quirk,
permits a particular class of industries, those making capital invest-
ments exceeding eighty-five million dollars, to negotiate a fee in lieu of
taxes that is lower than previously allowed under section 4-29-60.
The permitted fee reduction takes three forms.46 First, section 4-
29-67 permits a lower assessment ratio of not less than six percent of
the market value of the property. This compares to an assessment ratio
of ten and one-half percent otherwise required by article X, section
1(1) of the South Carolina Constitution. Second, the amendment al-
41. 394 S.E.2d 320 (S.C. 1990) (per curiam).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-29-67 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
43. Id. §§ 4-29-10 to -150 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp. 1990).
44. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-29-60 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
46. See id. § 4-29-67(B)(2)(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990).
[Vol. 43
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lows the private enterprise to apply a millage rate not less than the
rate applicable at the time of execution of the agreement to the
twenty-year allowable term of the lease agreement. Ordinarily, all
property in a taxing jurisdiction is subject to the millage rate deter-
mined by county governing authorities. This rate is subject to change
and generally increases over time. Third, the amendment allows the
private enterprise to freeze the fair market value of the property
throughout the term of the lease agreement. All other taxable property
is subject to a reappraisal of its fair market value as property values
change over time.
Pursuant to this new statutory authority, Richland County and
Union Camp Corporation entered into a sale and leaseback transaction
in connection with a proposed seven hundred million dollar expansion
of Union Camp's existing manufacturing facilities. The expansion was
to be financed by the issuance of industrial revenue bonds by the
county. The arrangement included an inducement agreement, under
which Union Camp agreed to pay a fee in lieu of ad valorem taxes. The
parties agreed to calculate the fee by using an assessment ratio of six
percent with the millage rate in effect on the date the county issued
the bonds. The lower fee was fixed and not subject to increase through-
out the twenty-year term of the agreement. William J. Quirk, a resi-
dent and taxpayer of Richland County, challenged the constitutionality
of section 4-29-67 and alleged that the statute -violated not only provi-
sions of the South Carolina Constitution relating to uniformity of ad
valorem taxation, but also the Equal Protection Clause of the South
Carolina and United States Constitutions.
47
The supreme court rejected Quirk's uniformity challenge. The
court based its decision on article X, section 3(a) of the South Carolina
Constitution,48 which exempts all county-owned property from ad
valorem taxation "if the property is used exclusively for public pur-
poses." 49 Because Richland County was to be the record owner of the
Union Camp expansion property, the only issue discussed by the court
was whether the property was to be used exclusively for public pur-
poses. In deciding the issue, the court followed established precedent 0
and exhibited great deference to the legislative determination of public
purpose. The court noted that "it is the purpose for which property is
used, not the method of accomplishment, which determines whether
47. Quirk v. Campbell, 394 S.E.2d 320, 321-22 (S.C. 1990) (per curiam).
48. S.C. CONST. art. X, § 3(a).
49. Id.
50. See Quirk, 394 S.E.2d at 322 (citing South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth. v. Sum-
mers, 282 S.C. 148, 318 S.E.2d 113 (1984); Taylor v. Davenport, 281 S.C. 497, 316 S.E.2d
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use is exclusively for public purposes, notwithstanding incidental bene-
fit [that] will accrue to a particular private business." 1
The court considered the 1967 case of Elliott v. McNair,52 which
upheld the constitutionality of the Act, as dispositive of the issue
presented in Quirk. In Elliott the court found that promoting indus-
trial development is a public purpose and, importantly, that a private
enterprise's receipt of a special benefit does not destroy the public pur-
pose. 3 The Quirk court noted that the special tax benefits challenged
in the present case, like those in Elliott, served the "public purpose of
promoting industrial development."
'54
The court similarly disposed of an equal protection challenge by
relying on United States Supreme Court and South Carolina precedent
that applied a rational relationship test to economic legislation. In de-
termining whether the classification was reasonably related to the leg-
islative purpose, the court simply stated that classifying industries
based on their capability and willingness to make capital investments
of at least eighty-five million dollars is "rationally related to [the] leg-
islative purpose of attracting large capital-intensive industries to this
State."5 5 In determining whether the constituents of the class were
treated equally, the court noted, "All such businesses are granted the
opportunity to negotiate for fees in lieu of taxes, provided the require-
ments of the Act are met.
5 6
The result reached in this case is consistent with the reasoning of
earlier South Carolina cases. However, several factors make the deci-
sion reached in Quirk notable for the effect of permitting to "be done
by indirection that which is specifically prohibited to be done di-
rectly. '57 The South Carolina Constitution clearly specifies the taxa-
tion applicable to industrial property58 and the tax benefits given to
new or expanding industry.59 Prior to the adoption of section 4-29-67,
the fee-in-lieu-of-taxes provision of the Act was essentially revenue
neutral for the county treasury because the Act had no effect on the
51. Id.
52. 250 S.C. 75, 156 S.E.2d 421 (1967).
53. Id. at 88-89, 156 S.E.2d at 428.
54. Quirk, 394 S.E.2d at 323.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Elliott, 250 S.C. at 86, 156 S.E.2d at 427.
58. Article X, section 1(1) states, "All real and personal property owned by or leased
to manufacturers... and used by the manufacturer... in the conduct of such business
shall be taxed on an assessment equal to ten and one-half percent of the fair market
value of such property." S.C. CONST. art. X, § 1(1).
59. Article X, section 3(g) grants a five year exemption from ad valorem taxation to
all businesses establishing new manufacturing facilities or making additions costing more
than fifty thousand dollars to existing facilities. Id. § 3(g).
[Vol. 43
7
et al.: Tax Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
TAX LAw
amount of local ad valorem taxes that the county would receive.60 Sec-
tion 4-29-67 permits, for the first time, a reduction in the amount of
the fee in lieu of taxes.
Obviously, the amendment permits large capital-intensive enter-
prises to negotiate a fee in lieu of the ad valorem taxes that is much
more favorable than the ad valorem taxes it would otherwise pay if
article X, section 1 of the South Carolina Constitution controls. The
court justified the result, however, by holding that the public purpose
doctrine of article X, section 3(a) exempts the property from ad
valorem taxation, and the property, therefore, is not subject to any of
the constitutional provisions relating to ad valorem taxation."1
Even though section 4-29-67 seems to contravene the plain lan-
guage of the constitution 6 2 Quirk is consistent with prior decisions and
shows great deference to the legislature's determination of a public
purpose. A showing that South Carolina's property taxes are second
highest among twelve southeastern states 3 and that the tax conces-
sions were a "decided factor" in the expansion decision of Union
Camp64 apparently convinced the court of the need for the county tax-
ing flexibility enacted by section 4-29-67.
Section 4-29-67 grants favored tax treatment to industries making
large capital investments in South Carolina. The supreme court contin-
ues to exhibit a high degree of deference towards the legislature's de-
termination that this type of preferential treatment ultimately will re-
sult in net benefits to the state by improving employment levels and
overall economic performance, notwithstanding the losses to county tax
revenues.
James Y. Becker
60. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-29-60 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
61. Quirk v. Campbell, 394 S.E.2d 320, 322 (S.C. 1990) (per curiam).
62. The supreme court's decisions in this area have produced some anomalous re-
sults. For example, in Powell v. Chapman, 260 S.C. 516, 197 S.E.2d 287 (1973), the court
held that county-owned property leased to industry pursuant to the Act is taxable prop-
erty for determining the county's bonded indebtedness limits for school purposes. Id. at
522, 197 S.E.2d at 290. Under Elliott and Quirk, the very same property would not be
considered taxable property for the purposes of complying with the uniformity provi-
sions of the state constitution.
63. Quirk, 394 S.E.2d at 321 n.3.
64. Id. at 321.
1991]
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